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Abstract 
 
The objective of the article is to study the positive 
experience of foreign countries in exercising 
departmental control over the activities of judges 
and to identify possible ways of its application in 
Ukraine. 
While writing the article the author has used 
general scientific and special methods of 
scientific cognition, namely: systematic, 
comparative and legal, functional and 
documentary analysis. 
Based on the analysis of scientific sources the 
author has studied the experience of the UK, 
France, Poland, Asian in exercising departmental 
control over the activities of judges. It has been 
determined that quite different approaches have 
been currently developed in Europe regarding the 
exercise of departmental control over the 
activities of judges, which is conditioned by the 
specifics of the legal systems of countries in 
general and the judicial system in particular. At 
the same time, despite the presence of certain 
differences, this does not exclude the possibility 
of applying the relevant positive foreign 
experience in our country. 
Based on the results of the conducted research, 
the following has been suggested, taking into 
   
Анотація 
 
Метою статті є вивчення позитивного досвіду 
зарубіжних країн щодо здійснення відомчого 
контролю за діяльністю суддів та визначення 
можливих шляхів його використання в Україні. 
Під час написання статті використано 
загальнонаукові та спеціальні методи 
наукового пізнання, а саме: системний, 
порівняльно-правовий, функціональний та 
документального аналізу. 
На основі аналізу наукових джерел вивчено 
досвід Великобританії, Франції, Польщі, Азії 
щодо здійснення відомчого контролю за 
діяльністю суддів. Визначено, що на 
сьогоднішній день в Європі склалися досить 
різні підходи щодо здійснення відомчого 
контролю за діяльністю суддів, що 
обумовлюється специфікою правових систем 
країн взагалі та систем судоустрою зокрема. 
Разом із тим, незважаючи на наявність певних 
відмінностей, це не виключає можливості 
застосування в нашій країні відповідного 
позитивного зарубіжного досвіду. За 
результатами проведеного дослідження з 
урахуванням зарубіжного досвіду щодо 
здійснення відомчого контролю за діяльністю 
суддів запропоновано наступне: 
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account international experience in exercising 
departmental control over the activities of 
judges: a) to optimize the system of entities, 
which are authorized to exercise control over the 
activity in the specified sphere; b) to create a 
legislative base for exercising departmental 
control over the activities of judges, in particular 
by developing and adopting a single legal act in 
this area; c) to strengthen the supervision over 
the courts while maintaining the limits of the 
independence of judges; d) to expand the 
financial and logistical support of the entities of 
departmental control; e) to create organizational 
and legal conditions, where judges will in no way 
be able to influence the departmental control; 
f) to develop a clear and understandable system 
for evaluating the performance of judges. 
 
Key words: departmental control, international 
experience, judicial authorities, a judge, 
legislation, a subject of control. 
 
а) оптимізувати систему суб’єктів, які 
уповноважені здійснювати контрольну 
діяльність в окресленій сфері; б) створити 
законодавчу базу для здійснення відомчого 
контролю за діяльністю суддів, зокрема 
шляхом розробки та прийняття єдиного 
нормативно-правового акта у цій сфері; 
в) посилити нагляд за діяльністю судів, 
зберігаючи при цьому межі самостійності та 
незалежності суддів; в) розширити фінансове 
та матеріально-технічне забезпечення суб’єктів 
відомчого контролю; г) створити організаційні 
та правові умови, за яких судді жодним чином 
не зможуть впливати на перебіг здійснення 
відомчого контролю; д) розробити чітку та 
зрозумілу систему оцінки діяльності суддів. 
 
Ключові слова: відомчий контроль, 
зарубіжний досвід, судові органи, суддя, 
законодавство, суб’єкт контролю. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Realization of material legal relationship is 
reached by means of will of the parties on the 
basis of the current legislation or the agreement 
of the parties. At the same time, regulatory legal 
relationship cannot always be to provide the 
normal course of realization of material legal 
relationship, for example, owing to violations of 
one of the parties of conditions of the obligations 
legal relationship which developed between the 
parties (Safin & Nurie, 2019, p. 439), which 
indicates the significant role of the judiciary in 
resolving such disputes. 
 
The administration of justice in each country is 
the foundation of that government, and 
governments are required to exercise effective 
oversight over the administration of justice, 
including the administration of justice, in all its 
dimensions, including social justice and its own 
survival (Rahmati, Sheidaeian, MirKhalili & 
Darabi, 2019, р. 189). 
 
The analysis of the scientific literature and norms 
of the current legislation of Ukraine makes it 
possible to state that the legislator is moving 
quite slowly towards improving the departmental 
control over the activities of judges. All this 
requires finding alternative ways to improve this 
legal institution, one of which is the study of 
international experience. After all, the study of 
international experience, it is like a surrogate of 
an experiment, which is impossible within law in 
its purest form, it allows to identify the aspects 
that can be adapted in the process of national 
rule-making (Kisilev, 2005, p. 11; Sorochyshyn, 
2017, p. 98). Therefore, the issues related to the 
exercise of departmental control over the 
activities of judges in foreign countries are 
important in the context of the conceptual reform 
of the judicial authorities in Ukraine. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
The dynamics for the improvement of the current 
legislation of Ukraine demonstrates the lack of 
systematicity in the changes and additions that 
regulate the issues of exercising departmental 
control over the activities of judges. First of all, 
it concerns the lack of effective control over the 
activities of judges of different instances 
regarding the judgments they take. In this regard, 
these and other issues related to the departmental 
control over the activities of judges have been the 
subject matter of the research in the scientific 
works of many scholars, in particular, such as: 
Berendt J. (2019), Berger Peter L. (1973), 
Chong  A. & Cozzubo A. (2019),                    
Ferreira e Silva R. A., Guimaraes T. A. &         
Sousa M. M. (2019), Hodovanets V. F. (2005), 
Kisilev I. Ya. (2005), Kuzmenko O. V.,     
Pastukh I. D., Korystin O. Ye. (2014), 
Nazarov I. V. (2011), Nestor N. V. (2019), 
Rahmati M., Sheidaeian M., MirKhalili S. & 
Darabi S. (2019), Razai S. S. (2018), Safin Z. & 
Nurie A. (2019), Sereda M. (2016), 
Sorochyshyn M. (2017), 
Thilakarathna K.A.A.N. (2019), Visser M. 
(2019), Yatsyshyn M. (2013) and others have 
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currently paid attention in their writings to 
various problems of improving departmental 
control over the activities of judges. However, 
despite the considerable number of scientific 
developments in this area, there are no 
comprehensive studies in the legal literature 
focused on international experience in exercising 
departmental control over the activities of judges. 
At the same time, the issues of exercising 
departmental control over the activities of judges 
were mostly researched either in the context of 
broader problematic issues – the reform of the 
judicial system, or in the context of the 
competence of the entities exercising this 
function. The above factors, as well as the 
presence of a sufficiently large number of 
regulatory novelties, the dynamics of the 
legislation concerning the activities of judges, 
make relevant the chosen topic of this article. 
 
Methodology 
 
This research is conducted using a qualitative 
method. The research uses primary legal sources 
such as legislative enactments provisions and 
decided case law foreign jurisdictions in order to 
accommodate a comparative study. As secondary 
legal sources this research uses writings of the 
highest authority in the field and other comments 
made on the subject by reputed scholars. 
 
The methodological basis of the article is a set of 
methods and techniques of scientific cognition. 
Systematic approach was used as a general 
scientific method, which provided an opportunity 
to identify problematic issues regarding the 
exercise of departmental control over the 
activities of judges. Comparative and legal 
method was useful while examining the 
legislation of certain foreign countries regarding 
the exercise of departmental control over the 
activities of judges. Functional method was used 
to reveal the orientation of the activities of judges 
in Ukraine and other countries. Documentary 
analysis made it possible to develop propositions 
and recommendations for improving the 
development of national legislation concerning 
the exercise of departmental control over the 
activities of judges. 
 
Results and discussion  
 
The connection between the words “judge”, 
“work” and “people” is prominent, as these 
words occurred most often. There is a 
relationship between the words “work” and 
“people” indicating the fact that the judiciary is 
necessary for society, so the work of the judges 
is directly linked to the people’s desire to resolve 
litigation and bring about social peace. The word 
“people” also refers to the fact that judges 
themselves are part of society and interact with 
other people. The judges see their work as an 
activity that generates value, and, in addition to 
providing personal financial rewards, contributes 
to society. The judiciary should be closer to the 
general public to avoid distortions caused by the 
media. Social media have played an important 
role in minimizing this distance from the 
judiciary (Ferreira, Guimaraes & Sousa, 2019,    
p. 61). Not only does a well-functioning judicial 
system support the protection of human rights, 
facilitate the resolution of disputes, and help hold 
governments accountable, it also protects 
property rights, encourages investment, and 
promotes economic growth (Chong & Cozzubo, 
2019). 
 
Judges and courts play a vital role in the 
development of law and politics in the country. 
But, despite their importance, there is a gap in 
legal scholarship about the significance and 
function of judges across the region. Social 
constraints and the types of expectations society 
will have on judges are partly determined by the 
particular attributes of the society in which the 
judge works. In other words, the judge’s role is 
determined by his/her society’s reality. Judges 
have a social function that is interdependent with 
their society. This manifests itself in complex 
arrangements such as judicial systems, judicial 
roles and judicial identities. Therefore, any 
understanding of the judge and the judicial 
function (in the Arab Middle East and elsewhere) 
ought to consider the assumptions widely held 
within a particular society about judges (Berger, 
1973; Razai, 2018). 
 
It is advisable to start considering the best 
practices from the leading European countries, 
including the United Kingdom. Despite 
numerous judicial reforms, the British judicial 
system remains at present complex and 
decentralized. Due to the fact that case law is an 
essential part of the constitution, the system of 
higher courts is very extensive. The highest court 
institution in the United Kingdom is the House of 
Lords, which reviews the claims of appellate 
institutions of England and Wales, as well as 
Scotland (civil cases only). The opinion of the 
House of Lords is transmitted to the appropriate 
appellate court, which formulates a decision in 
accordance with this conclusion (Hodovanets, 1, 
2005). 
 
The current system of selecting judges in 
England and Wales was introduced based on the 
2005 Constitutional Reform Act. Prior to this 
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reform, the system of appointing judges for their 
positions was relatively simple. Political and 
legal responsibility for the appointment of judges 
was carried out by the Lord Chancellor of Her 
Majesty, who selected the candidates who met 
the requirements for the positions of judges. The 
Queen of Great Britain formally appointed 
judges to their positions. It is interesting that the 
introduction of the new system was not prompted 
by an urgent need. The British people admit that 
the former method of appointing judges worked 
quite well. Candidates were appointed as judges 
only if they were worthy of such appointment. 
There was no way for any political influence. The 
Lord Chancellor usually acted on the advice of 
senior judges who were able to identify viable 
candidates. At the same time, critics of the old 
system noted the imperfection of the procedure, 
whereby a member of the government was 
exclusively responsible for appointing judges. 
That system also did not comply with the 
traditional principle of separation of state power, 
because the judicial power, though formally, was 
influenced by the legislative and executive 
branches of power (Sereda, 2016).  
 
Parliament is the key subject of carrying out 
control over the activities of the main public 
authorities. Parliamentary control in Britain is 
based on the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility. The essence of this doctrine is that 
the minister takes responsibility for the activities 
of his ministry and must resign, if there are 
deficiencies in the work of the ministry 
subordinated to him. Parliamentary control has 
public nature, combined with public control and 
the institution of political responsibility of the 
ruling party in the next elections. This is 
achieved, in particular, by the constant 
broadcasting of the meetings of the House of 
Commons. The following forms of control are 
used in the House of Commons: oral requests; 
written requests (interpellation); vote of no 
confidence; the functioning of ad hoc 
parliamentary committees to supervise the 
activities of each ministry and the entire 
government in the whole; Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration. For example, 
according to the regulations of the House of 
Commons, a daily meeting (except Friday) 
begins with an “inquiry hour” (Yatsyshyn, 2013). 
It should also be noted that complaints about the 
work of judges in England and Wales are 
currently being processed by the new Bureau of 
Judicial Complaints, which is accountable to 
both the Chief Justice (High Court of Justice in 
England and Wales) and the Lord Chancellor. 
The final decision is taken by the Lord Chief 
Justice and the Lord Chancellor. If a judge 
requests a review, a panel of 4 persons is created, 
where two of them are judges and two – associate 
judges (who are scheduled by a panel of 20 
people, who, in turn, are selected by open 
contest). The Lord Chief Justice and the Lord 
Chancellor cannot impose a more severe 
sentence than the one recommended by the 
Review Board. If the Chief Justice is to be 
dismissed, then the Lord Chancellor proposes his 
dismissal to both Chambers of Parliament, 
followed by a referral to the Queen in case of 
support. In case of lower-level judges, the Lord 
Chancellor dismisses them personally (The 
English System of Justice, 2014; Nestor, 2019). 
The next European country that we will pay 
attention to is France. The judicial system of 
France is a classic dualistic model and consists of 
general and administrative courts, which are 
independent and headed by the Court of 
Cassation of France and the State Council. When 
dividing general and administrative courts 
horizontally, they form three levels. Besides, 
there is sectoral structuring within the structural 
organization of each of the levels. There is also a 
large number of specialized courts, which in 
most cases have fewer levels. The presence of 
such a complex judicial system makes it possible 
to dispute competence and jurisdiction. The 
Conflict Tribunal has been set up to resolve these 
disputes. It consists of eight members: each three 
are elected by the Court of Cassation and the 
State Council. These six members are elected 
from among their colleagues in the relevant 
agency two more members of the Tribunal and 
two of their deputies. Re-elections are held every 
three years. The Chief Justice of the Tribunal is 
the Minister of Justice, but in fact the Tribunal is 
governed by a Vice-Chief appointed by the 
Minister of Justice (Hodovanets, 2, 2005). 
 
Considerable attention in France is paid to the 
evaluation of the activities of judges. Legislative 
consolidation of the system of evaluation of 
judges’ activities took place in 2005. Conducting 
an appropriate assessment contributes to the 
“efficiency and quality of justice in the country. 
Besides, the value of conducting a proper 
assessment is that it enables you to evaluate not 
only professional, but also personal qualities of 
judges, to encourage them to work better and to 
develop new approaches to their work. It is 
important for the evaluation to remain objective, 
comprehensive, since any assessment depends on 
the human factor and therefore there is a kind of 
subjectivity. Thus, an assessment made against a 
particular judge must ignore the human factor 
and, in a sense, be impersonal. Such a system of 
assessment, in the opinion of French scholars, is 
much better than the rating system, which had 
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operated in France since May 15, 1850. The old 
system of rating magistrates has revealed an 
undue influence of the executive branch on the 
activities of controlling entities. 
 
It is important to note that the French legislator 
while developing the outlined evaluation system, 
paid great attention to ensure the principles of 
autonomy and independence of judges. 
Therefore, the guarantees of objectivity of this 
system of evaluation necessarily went through 
the fixation of indicators that do not allow 
deviations towards any personal evaluation. The 
criteria used were clarified by the order dated 
from May 12, 2009. The latter emphasizes the 
value of assessing the professional value of 
judges. Therefore, the proposed criteria have a 
variable geometry, since “they depend on the 
degree of the judge’s position”. In addition to 
these criteria, which are listed in the annex to the 
ruling dated from May 12, 2009, the evaluation 
is formally based on a professional interview 
report, which includes important headings that 
allow the evaluator to assess the achievement of 
goals and results obtained by the evaluated judge 
(which usually provides that professional goals 
were set in advance). Another section also allows 
the evaluator to set goals for the year ahead, 
thereby recording the assessment in a specific 
order. Other headings relate to planned training 
and career perspectives. These numerous criteria 
or evaluations of approaches indicate the 
pluralism of the concept of quality of work of 
judges. In addition to quantitative evaluation, the 
General Secretariat of the State Council also 
notes that such goals “must necessarily include 
the qualitative aspect”, with respect to the section 
“goals and results”. Therefore, the assessment is 
not limited to a simple evaluation of the work of 
the judges, measured, for example, by the 
number of files processed during the year – on 
the contrary, special attention is paid to a more 
“meaningful” approach to quality. 
 
The experience of the Polish Republic deserves 
special attention in the framework of the 
presented scientific work. The power in Poland, 
as in most democratic states, is exercised on the 
principles of its separation into legislative 
(parliament), executive (government) and 
judicial. The judicial power is exercised by free 
and independent courts (the Supreme Court, 
courts of general jurisdiction, administrative 
courts, military courts), as well as tribunals (the 
Constitutional Tribunal –correspondent to the 
Ukrainian Constitutional Court and the State 
Tribunal). This is stated by the Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland in the Article “The power 
of courts and tribunals is separate and 
independent from other powers” (Kuzmenko, 
Pastukh & Korystin, 2014). 
 
Nowadays, Poland’s key regulatory act in the 
area of judicial control is the Order of the 
Ministry of Justice “On Approval of the 
Procedure for the Supervision over 
Administrative Activity of the Courts” 
(Rozporządzenie ministra sprawiedliwości, 
2002). The supervision of the Minister of Justice 
over the administrative activity of the courts is 
carried out in relation to: defining and agreeing 
the directions of supervision performed by the 
heads of the courts; evaluations of supervisory 
task plans submitted by the heads of the court; 
conduct special visits and inspections of judges, 
supervisory activities of the heads of the courts, 
offices of district employees of the service, as 
well as issuing relevant decrees; prepare and 
analyze annual information on the activity of the 
courts; control and evaluate materials related to 
the supervision by the heads of the courts and the 
issuance of mandatory instructions; organize 
consultations with judges and other court staff 
after the visits; assess the qualifications of judges 
who are candidates for high-level judicial 
positions in connection with the intention of the 
Minister of Justice to notify the National Council 
of Judicial Authorities of this appointment; 
ongoing or periodic control over the progress of 
the proceedings in certain cases, if the 
circumstances that indicate that they are being 
conducted improperly or in violation of the law 
are revealed. 
 
An important subject of control over the 
activities of judges in Poland is the Chief of the 
Court. The tasks of the chief of the court to 
supervise the administrative activity of the court 
include: 1) analysis of the case law in the sent 
court in terms of assessing the level of its 
uniformity and request clarification of legal 
provisions that raise doubts in practice; 
2) checking the compliance with the rules of 
division of cases between judges; 3) analysis of 
statistical materials concerning the work of 
supervisory courts, in particular, the status of 
arrears and efficiency of justice, as well as the 
efficiency of judges’ work, assessors and judges; 
4) control over the work of inspectors and office 
inspectors; 5) control over the performance of 
supervisory functions by the heads of 
departments; 6) current or periodic monitoring 
over the progress of the proceedings in certain 
cases, if the circumstances are revealed, which 
indicate that they are conducted improperly or in 
violation of the law. 
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In the context of the issues presented in the 
scientific work, it should be noted that the ruling 
party of Poland insists on the development of 
new legislation that strengthens the control over 
judges, despite fears of European Union officials 
that it will undermine the independence of the 
judicial system and the country’s democracy. 
The bill seeks to ensure that judges do not 
question the independence of the colleagues 
appointed by the Board and those controlled by 
the ruling party. It also aims to punish judges 
who criticize the government’s campaign to 
rebuild the judicial system or are engaged in 
“political activity” without specifying what 
constitutes such activity (Berendt, 2019). Polish 
people in late 2019, protested in 160 cities across 
the country to express their anger over the 
suggested legislation and to force lawmakers to 
reject it. Poland’s Supreme Court has warned that 
the bill could pave the way for the country’s 
brexit from the European Union in the whole. 
While such a brexit seems highly doubtful, the 
European Commission has taken the unusual step 
of urging the Polish Parliament, the President and 
the Prime-Minister to suspend all deliberations 
and to consult with the Venice Commission – a 
panel of experts on European constitutional law 
– in regard to the legislation. 
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights has warned the leadership of the 
Polish state that the changes that the legislature 
is trying to introduce are too much to risk further 
undermining the independence of judges in the 
country. In the light of the above, the European 
Union Commissioner for Justice Didier 
Reynders warned in Brussels that the rule of law 
in Poland is being undermined and said that the 
European Union is ready to do its utmost to 
protect the independence of the Polish judicial 
system. Hundreds of judges, lawyers and 
prosecutors in Poland are already being 
disciplined for criticizing the government. All of 
the above has led to the ruling party moving away 
from intentions to amend the appropriate 
legislation (Berendt, 2019). So far, Poland’s 
legislation in the field of exercising departmental 
control over the activities of judges is still 
unchanged. 
 
Looking at the independence of judges in the 
context of Asian constitutions, Maartje De Visser 
noted that at its broadest, the decentralized model 
of judicial review offers judges opportunities to 
side-step controversial constitutional questions 
that are unavailable to the same extent, or at all, 
to distinct constitutional courts. When deciding 
on the merits of developmental claims, courts 
should combine a strong presumption of 
constitutionality as far as the substance of the law 
is concerned with robust scrutiny of compliance 
with procedural guarantees. Additionally, courts 
should be better equipped with knowledge about 
the methodologies used by and insights from 
other social sciences to enable them to better 
evaluate extra-legal evidence submitted. This 
will also make it possible to better anticipate the 
likely economic consequences of particular 
judicial findings, possibly with a view to 
tailoring their remedies accordingly. What is 
more, the decentralized exercise of review 
facilitates access to constitutional justice for 
affected individuals and communities in remote 
and rural areas, making this the preferred 
institutional design for constitutional 
adjudication in large developing countries 
(Visser, 2019). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Judicial review, as a discretionary remedy has the 
strength of being able to take each case upon their 
relevant merits. Therefore, it becomes paramount 
that, while having judicial review as the last 
bastion of hope where every other mechanism 
fails to adequately protect, the maintenance 
should come from a supreme force of law, which 
in most of the instances is the constitution. In 
considering this, judicial review itself should 
advocate for the constitutional recognition of 
rights (Thilakarathna, 2019, p. 22). 
 
Quite different approaches have currently 
emerged in Europe regarding the exercise of 
departmental control over the activity of courts 
(judges), which is conditioned by the specificity 
of legal systems in general and judicial systems 
in particular. However, despite the presence of 
certain differences, this does not exclude the 
possibility of applying the relevant international 
experience in our country. In particular, it is 
advisable, in our opinion to: 
 
− optimize the system of entities that are 
empowered to carry out control 
activities in the specified field, since 
such a system seems too extensive in 
Ukraine, unlike most of the leading 
countries of the world;  
− create a legislative base for exercising 
departmental control over the activity of 
judges (courts) by adopting and 
developing a single regulatory act in 
this area;  
− to increase the supervision over the 
courts, but the limits on the 
independence of judges should not be 
narrowed;  
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− we consider it expedient to expand the 
financial and logistical provision of the 
entities of departmental control;  
− create organizational and legal 
conditions, where judges will in no way 
interfere with the progress of 
departmental control;  
− develop a clear and understandable 
system for evaluating the performance 
of judges. 
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